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THE CHURCH OF ORIGINALISM 
S. L. Whitesell* 
“On every question of construction, [we] carry ourselves back to the time 
when the Constitution was adopted, recollect the spirit manifested in the de-
bates, and instead of trying what meaning may be squeezed out of the text, 
or invented against it, conform to the probable one in which it was 
passed . . . .  Laws are made for men of ordinary understanding, and should, 
therefore, be construed by the ordinary rules of common sense.  Their 
meaning is not to be sought for in metaphysical subtleties, which may make 
anything mean everything or nothing, at pleasure.” 
Thomas Jefferson1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Thomas Jefferson wrote these words in 1823, long after the end of 
his public career and two years before his death.  One hundred and 
fifty years later, a movement emerged that sought to recapture the 
spirit of Jefferson’s advice.  Perceiving that judges were using meta-
physical subtleties to remake the Constitution in their own image, the 
originalist movement called for a return to the framing generation’s 
understandings of constitutional text.  The call did not go unan-
swered:  scholars and judges leveled powerful criticisms against 
originalism that its scholarly adherents could not ignore.  Since the 
first pitched battles in the 1970s and 1980s, this battle for the Consti-
tution’s meaning has raged on.  Originalism has matured from nas-
cent antagonist to perhaps the dominant force in interpretive theory. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I owe special thanks to Pro-
fessor Sophia Lee for her prudence in narrowing my ambitions and her wise and exten-
sive feedback on earlier drafts.  I also thank Ryan Williams, Sharswood Fellow in Original-
ism at the University of Pennsylvania, for his generous and patient advice.  As is his wont, 
David Bernstein swiftly and genially corrected my misconceptions about Lochner.  And 
Professor William Ewald’s tutelage was indispensable in framing a more nuanced under-
standing of the founding error. 
 1 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge William Johnson (June 12, 1823), in 15 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 439, 449–50 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery 
Bergh eds., Mem’l ed. 1904).  This maxim is part of a disquisition on jurisprudence in 
which Jefferson directly criticized Chief Justice John Marshall for his “very irregular and 
very censurable” behavior on the bench. Id. at 447. 
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Although originalism appears to be ascendant on the legal battle-
field today, misconceptions abound regarding the theory’s (or theo-
ries’) content and the movement’s history.  On the standard telling, 
the “Old Originalism” was concerned primarily with original intent, 
asking what the actual enactors actually thought.  This theory became 
encumbered by criticism and theoretical difficulties, like so many ep-
icycles on a Ptolemaic system.  Originalists responded by rejecting in-
tent in favor of objective public meaning—that is, how the contempo-
raneous public would have understood the text.  So it was that the 
“New Originalists,” adherents to original public meaning originalism, 
displaced their outmoded ancestors.  The sense is that the transition 
from intent to meaning was a sharp and total break from what had 
come before—a paradigm shift, to borrow from the epistemologists. 
The common story overstates the trend from intentions to mean-
ing, leaving the impression that originalism is gradually working to-
ward a pure, platonic theory of constitutional meaning.  This Com-
ment proposes a different way of understanding originalism’s history.  
Old Originalism did not encounter a Ptolemaic crisis, eventually 
dropping its epicycles in a fit of Kuhnian revolution.2  Science is the 
wrong analogy:  we should look instead to other belief communities.  
As originalism matured and gained a wider following, adherents 
adopted different modalities that eventually sorted originalists into 
different camps.  The better model is to think of originalism like an 
early church which, when difficult questions arise, divides into sects.3  
Rather than a paradigm shift, it may be more apt to speak of a 
schism.  Like all analogies, this comparison to religion will fail at 
some level.  The Constitution is not Holy Writ, so disagreement can-
not become heresy; there is no magisterial edifice in legal theory, so 
those sects cannot be banished like recalcitrant Pelagians.  For vari-
ous reasons (not least because less is at stake than with sacred doc-
 
 2 See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996).  
For a Kuhnian perspective on republicanism in legal scholarship, see Daniel T. Rodgers, 
Republicanism:  The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11 (1992). 
 3 Others have invoked a similar motif.  See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, That Old-Time Originalism, 
in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM:  THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 223, 
244 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) (comparing the “plight” of Old 
Originalism to “that of the old-time religious believers”); Lee J. Strang, The Most Faithful 
Originalist?:  Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia, and the Future of Originalism, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. 
REV. 873, 879 (2011) (using biblical language to refer to Justice Scalia’s and Justice 
Thomas’s relationships to originalism). 
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trine), the various camps of modern originalism are considerably 
more amicable than, say, the Anabaptists and the Zwinglians.4 
Part I recounts the history of originalism in order to provide the 
context of the intentions/meaning distinction.  In telling this story, 
this Comment is sensitive to parts of the narrative that are often mar-
ginalized, causing some of the misapprehension.  Examining the nar-
rative at a higher resolution allows lessons to be drawn from the Old 
about the New.  Part II then takes a closer look at originalism as a 
family of theories, seeking an accurate account of how elements in 
the Old map on to the New.  Identifying the chronological shift from 
Old to New is a helpful first step, but it is not a complete explanation.  
The central proposal of this Comment is that New Originalism con-
tains a division between “High Originalism” and “Low Originalism,” 
based roughly on how great a role the actual human enactors play in 
originalist interpretation.  This division was latent in the Old 
Originalism and, indeed, lurks beneath Jefferson’s words.  This 
should make it clear that High and Low are not substitutes for Old 
and New. 
I.  THE STORY OF ORIGINALISM 
In some quarters originalism brings with it preconceptions that 
may interfere with properly understanding it (let alone arguing its 
merits).  It is possible to offer a reply brief, as it were, to these liminal 
objections and attempt to satisfy the reader that he should proceed to 
the merits.  This Comment may accomplish some of that in what fol-
lows.  But it is considerably easier and perhaps less contentious to 
begin with a narrative of originalism’s emergence.  A quick sketch 
explains why originalism was largely reactive and untheorized when it 
emerged around the bicentennial of independence.  This Part briefly 
describes the context out of which originalism emerged before re-
constructing its history in greater detail. 
A preliminary distinction is the one between the use of history and 
the search for original understanding on the one hand, and original-
ism as an “ism” on the other.  It would be reasonable to define 
originalism as an a posteriori designation of interpretive methods that 
 
 4 When the Anabaptists repeatedly refused to acquiesce to infant baptism, the city council 
of Zurich finally issued an ironic edict:  “He who dips, shall be dipped.”  The leading An-
abaptist Reformers were bound and cast into the river Limmat.  8 PHILIP SCHAFF, HISTORY 
OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 55 (3d ed. rev. The Electronic Bible Society 1998) (1892). 
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meet certain criteria, for instance a focus on text and history,5 but this 
Comment will reserve the term for the organized expressions of theo-
ry and practice that began to emerge in the 1970s.6  Using the label in 
this way recognizes a lexical fact (the term itself dates to the 1980s7) 
and respects the historical implications of that fact.  The term is also 
not applied loosely to any interpretive theory that has regard for orig-
inal meaning.  Using it this way8 dilutes it beyond usefulness.  What 
follows, then, describes originalism in the United States. 
A.  Before Originalism 
Whatever else their differences, English political theorists at the 
time of the American Revolution were united behind the principle 
that Parliament is sovereign:  indeed, “[i]t can, in short, do every-
thing that is not naturally impossible.”9  As the pamphlet wars leading 
up to Lexington demonstrate, the War of Independence was fought 
 
 5 O’Neill uses the term “textual originalism” to describe pre-New Deal interpretive meth-
ods.  A feature of these methods is that they uncritically conflated what is now called tex-
tualism and originalism.  JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND 
POLITICS:  A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 12–42 (2005). 
 6 This is in part to avoid conversational difficulty with those who may think that originalism 
claims too much for itself.  See James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1335, 1347 (1997) (recognizing somewhat critically that originalism 
arose as a movement from conservative politics). 
 7 A Google NGram viewer inquiry is published as an appendix.  Google Books Ngram 
Viewer, http://books.google.com/ngrams (last visited May 13, 2014).  See also Lawrence 
B. Solum, What is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory 2–5 (2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1825543 (recounting the history of the word 
“originalism”). 
 8 E.g., Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory:  The Case of 
Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1769–70 (1997) (labeling judicial use of history in 
nonoriginalist contexts as “ancestral originalism” and “heroic originalism”).  But see James 
E. Fleming, Original Meaning Without Originalism, 85 GEO. L. J. 1849, 1851, 1855 (1997) 
(pointing out the confusion Dorf engenders by appropriating the term). 
 9 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 129 (4th ed.) (Lon-
don, John Murray 1876).  Blackstone’s description of Parliament sounds rather like he is 
describing a deity—“The power and jurisdiction of parliament, says Sir Edward Coke, is so 
transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be confined either for causes or persons within 
any bounds,” and  
[i]t has sovereign and uncontrollable authority in the making, confirming, 
enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of 
laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or 
temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal:  this being the place where 
that absolute despotic power . . .  is intrusted [sic] by the constitution of 
these kingdoms. 
  Id. at 128.  It chills the American blood. 
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in large part over this very dispute.10  After the dust settled at York-
town, the American political settlement rejected legislative sovereign-
ty, adopting instead the apotheosis of social contract theory:  popular 
sovereignty.  The real disagreement between English and American 
conceptions concerns the locus of sovereignty.  For the English, the 
people once, in time immemorial, spoke Parliament into existence 
and its rule on their behalf–and as their representatives—was then 
eternal.  For Americans, the consent of the governed is the font of 
sovereignty and its continuing warrant.  The “revolution principle” 
holds not only that “the supreme or sovereign power of the society 
resides in the citizens at large” but that “they always retain the right of 
abolishing, altering, or amending their constitution, at whatever time, 
and in whatever manner, they shall deem it expedient.”11  The people 
spoke the Constitution into being, ordering their subservient gov-
ernment as they pleased.  The government would not have the power 
to alter its metes and bounds without their consent. 
The Constitution, then, was an instrument of the people to con-
trol their government just as an act of Parliament controlled the sub-
jects of the realm.  Blackstone may have said that Parliament was “un-
controulable,”12 but he and the Americans shared a common view of 
how such instruments should be construed.  Here the Lion and the 
Eagle converge:  the intent of the lawgiver is paramount.  Blackstone 
organized his canons of construction around the central goal of giv-
ing effect to the legislative undertaking.13  Influenced by Blackstone 
in its study of law and reacting to the abuses of a distant sovereign,14 
the founding generation of the United States adopted a positive law 
constitution.15  Hamilton manifests this theme in the 78th Federalist; 
this is important because the Federalist is the means by which Publius 
 
 10 See C. Bradley Thompson, The Revolutionary Origins of American Constitutionalism, in 
HISTORY ON PROPER PRINCIPLES:  ESSAYS IN HONOR OF FORREST MCDONALD 1–18 (Stephen 
M. Klugewicz & Lenore T. Ealy eds., 2010). 
 11 1 JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 399, 440 (Kermit 
L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007). 
 12 James Wilson, Opening Address at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, in 1 THE 
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993). 
 13 Thompson, supra note 10, at 15. 
 14 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 2–3 (U.S. 1776) (expressing concern 
about tyrannical governments, especially that of the King of Great Britain).  
 15 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).  Whatever else the Constitution is, it is at 
least that much.  The claim here is not meant to provoke controversy over whether the 
Constitution is also a common law charter or an invitation to moral reasoning. 
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sought to allay fears of latent tyranny in the new Constitution.16  It is a 
strong bridge between Blackstonian intentionalism17 and America’s 
founding generation. 
Early American practice corroborates that the mindset successfully 
arrived in the new republic.  The mode of argument is invoked in 
debates in the early congresses,18 in the judicial reasoning of the early 
Court,19 in scholarly treatises,20 and even in Reconstruction era de-
bates.21  As noted below, there is some question about what kind and 
whose intent these early jurists sought, but there is no real dispute 
that they sought to give the law the effect its words conveyed.  But by 
the end of the nineteenth century, during and around the oft-
criticized Lochner era,22 formalist logic and Progressive activism began 
to place a great strain on the text.  For several decades the judiciary 
frustrated legislative efforts to regulate society on the basis of, for ex-
ample, a “deduced” right of economic due process, leading even 
freemarketeers to sympathize with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s 
protest that the Constitution “does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s 
Social Statics.”23  Lochner and the jurisprudential debates surrounding 
it thus fueled the contention that constitutional interpretation was 
essentially a political task.  Resonating with James Bradley Thayer’s 
famous essay,24 the Lochner Court became an icon of the counter-
 
 16 Raoul Berger, Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 350, 
351 (1988) (describing how the federalists sought to reassure the ratifiers by downplaying 
both the power of the judges and the powers of the Presidency).  
 17 The word is enigmatic and there is disagreement about whether the colonial-era English 
theorists sought authorial or objective intent.  See infra Part I.B. 
 18 See O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 16–17 (discussing early congressional debates over constitu-
tional meanings). 
 19 An examination of the reports of the first several decades of Supreme Court decisions—
especially the early seriatim opinions—will bear this out.  E.g., Miller v. The Ship Resolu-
tion, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 1, 3-4 (Fed. Ct. App. 1781) (interpreting an "ordinance of Congress" 
so as to avoid a "violence both to [its] terms and spirit, or intention"); Chisholm v. Geor-
gia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 437 (1793) (Iredell, J.) (referring to "the clear intention of the 
act"), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Glass v. The Sloop 
Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 12 (1794) (seeking "the intention of the legislature"). 
 20 E.g., 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Bos-
ton, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833); THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS (Da Capo Press 1972) (1868). 
 21 See O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 21–24 (discussing originalism in the Reconstruction era). 
 22 See generally David N. Mayer, Substantive Due Process Rediscovered:  The Rise and Fall of Liberty 
of Contract, 60 MERCER L. REV. 563 (2009) (discussing the “misunderstood . . . forty-year 
period known as the ‘Lochner Era’”). 
 23 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 24 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. 
L. REV. 17 (1893). 
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majoritarian difficulty.25  David Bernstein has chronicled the many 
failings with this view of Lochner and its Court; the subject is quite 
complex and his book is an important inoculation against breezy 
condemnations.  Still, the politicization of the Constitution reached 
new heights in this crucible of “creedal passion.”26 
By the time President Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected, the tradi-
tional methods of interpretation “conflicted with modern intellectual 
trends and directly confronted the New Deal”27 political forces.  The 
confluence of new ways of thinking across large swathes of human 
thought is too large a subject even to summarize here, but it must suf-
fice to say that the shift in jurisprudence was not an isolated phe-
nomenon.28  Against the arrayed forces of modernist thought and 
immense political pressure, the old order laid down its arms and was 
consigned to a supporting role over the next half century.29 
In the “good old days,” however, the Court was neither always 
faithful to its purported goals30 nor especially rigorous in the execu-
tion of its task.31  Common law precedence over statutory enactments 
was an idea with some pedigree, as it was raised by Sir Edward Coke 
 
 25 See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1962). 
 26 See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS:  THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY 
85–90, 130–148 (1981) (describing the peculiarly American phenomenon of “creedal 
passion periods”); cf. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures:  Discovering the Constitution, 93 
YALE L.J. 1013, 1054–55 (justifying, among other things, the New Deal as a legitimate 
“constitutional moment” during which the people move beyond ordinary politics). 
 27 O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 28. 
 28 Woodrow Wilson had brought a modern view to politics much earlier:  “[G]overnment is 
not a machine, but a living thing.  It falls, not under the theory of the universe, but under 
the theory of organic life.  It is accountable to Darwin, not to Newton.”  WOODROW 
WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 56 (1908).  An iconic 
evisceration of modernism, tracing the degradation of culture since at least the Renais-
sance, can be found in RICHARD M. WEAVER, IDEAS HAVE CONSEQUENCES (1948).  See also 
C. S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN (1947) (observing the incoherence of relativism); 
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:  SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM 
AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973).  
 29 O’Neill notes that arguments from original intent and meaning continued to be persua-
sive even as they ceased to be authoritative.  O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 37–39.  See also Lo-
rianne Updike Toler et al., Pre-”Originalism”, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 277, 318–19 
(2012) (noticing that the Warren and Burger courts invoked historical meaning at a 
higher rate than others).  But see Fleming, supra note 6, at 1347 (distinguishing between 
the “uses of history” as employed and discussed in the 1960s and originalism, and suggest-
ing that the former is the norm). 
 30 See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW (1990) [hereinafter BORK, TEMPTING] (tracing through history the impulse of 
judges to reach outside the constitution to enact their own political preferences). 
 31 See Toler et al., supra note 29, at 303 (acknowledging the nineteenth century Court’s use 
of history but pointing out its methodological inconsistencies). 
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in Dr. Bonham’s Case.32  And in America, the specter of judicial usurpa-
tion in the name of natural justice presented itself in the very first 
decade in the famous scrap between Justices Samuel Chase and James 
Iredell.33  Writing seriatim, Justice Chase volunteered his opinion that 
“the nature, and ends of legislative power will limit the exercise of 
it.”34  Justice Iredell dressed him down with the argument for judicial 
review prominent in Marbury and Federalist 78.35  Whatever the his-
torical merits of originalism’s claim to an older orthodoxy, the im-
portant fact is that originalists perceive themselves as operating with-
in this narrative.36 
Likewise, the new method of interpretation, while ascendant, was 
not unopposed.  Judicial decisions came with strong dissents.37  
Moreover, it is counterproductive (and not only by virtue of being 
uncharitable) to ignore liberal criticisms of the Court in this era.  
Standing in a long stream of process theory, these began almost im-
mediately38 and political liberals continued to struggle with the prob-
 
 32 (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P.).  Coke’s assertion that “in many cases, the common law 
will . . . controul Acts of Parliament” is the subject of controversy.  Id. at 652.  See generally 
John V. Orth, Did Sir Edward Coke Mean What He Said?, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 33, 34 
(1999) (questioning whether Coke was “merely mouthing dicta” in Dr. Bonham’s Case). 
 33 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).  See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY:  
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 274–75 (2d ed. 1997) (discuss-
ing Justices Chase and Iredell’s points of view in Calder); BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 30, 
at 19–20 (discussing the constitutional disagreement between Justices Chase and Iredell 
in Calder). 
 34 Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388. 
 35 Id. at 398–99. (“The power, however, is judicial in its nature; and wherever it is exercised, 
as in the present instance, it is an exercise of judicial, not of legislative, authority.”). 
 36 Robert Bork certainly did, and it is uncontroversial to say that political conservatives in 
the post-Reagan years regard Bork’s failed nomination as the climax of the first pitched 
battle.  Justice Scalia likewise rejects Professor Gordon Wood’s invocation of Dr. Bonham’s 
Case and asserts that “[t]he genuine orthodoxy is set forth in Blackstone[.]”  Antonin 
Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 129, 
130 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, Response]. 
 37 E.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 675–76 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]here is no constitutional support whatever for this Court to use the Due Process 
Clause as though it provided a blank check to alter the meaning of the Constitution as 
written so as to add to it substantive constitutional changes which a majority of the Court 
at any given time believes are needed to meet present-day problems.”); id. at 686 (Harlan, 
J., dissenting) (“[I]t is all wrong, in my view, for the Court to adopt the political doctrines 
popularly accepted at a particular moment of our history and to declare all others to be 
irrational and invidious, barring them from the range of choice by reasonably minded 
people acting through the political process.”). 
 38 See G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration:  Jurisprudential Criticism and So-
cial Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 280–82 (1973) (discussing the elements of Realism in 
American jurisprudence, which it is argued emerged in the 1930s).  Interestingly, the sus-
tained attacks from the left began in earnest in 1937, a year usually regarded as the mo-
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lem of the Court as a “naked power organ.”39  It is worthwhile for to-
day’s originalists to take note of these criticisms:  the call for “neu-
tral”40 or at least “principled”41 decision-making was not reserved to 
opponents of the Court’s substantive policy results. 
The narrative provides the context for originalism’s imminent 
emergence—a context of the shared search for a principled and or-
derly jurisprudence.  Writing in 1973, G. Edward White sought it in 
the interplay between realism and “reasoned elaboration.”42  White 
was either unaware or uninterested in another answer that had been 
latent for many years, but which had received a forceful articulation 
just a few years earlier:  the principle of original understanding.  It is 
to this that we now turn. 
B.  Originalism Rising 
Gilbert Chesterton observed that the complexity of a belief is of-
ten an impediment to getting its defense underway, a torpor that 
“arises, oddly enough, from an indifference about where one should 
begin.”43  In the case of Old Originalism, politics dictated where to 
begin:  with the problem of judicial overreach.44 
When Richard Nixon ran for president in 1968 on a law and order 
platform, one element of his campaign was his promise to appoint 
“strict constructionists” to the bench.45  But this was more of an im-
pulse than a movement, an appeal to “irritable mental gestures”46 ra-
ther than to a cogent theory.  Nixon’s politicking would have been an 
appropriate target for Thomas Grey’s charge that conservative juris-
 
ment textualism was routed from the field.  Id. at 282 (“The year 1937 marked the emer-
gence of fullblown attacks on the Realists.”). 
 39 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 
(1959); White, supra note 38, at 288–93. 
 40 Wechsler, supra note 39, at 15 (“But must [courts] not decide on grounds of adequate 
neutrality and generality, tested not only by the instant application but by others that the 
principles imply?”). 
 41 E.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41–42 (1961) 
(criticizing the Vinson Court for failing to develop discernible principles).  
 42 See White, supra note 38, at 296–302. 
 43 GILBERT K. CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 153 (1908). 
 44 Compare the confirmation hearings of Justices Marshall and Rehnquist, as reported in 
Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599–600 (2004) 
[hereinafter Whittington, New Originalism]. 
 45 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131–32 (1977); Whittington, New Original-
ism, supra note 44, at 600. 
 46 Lionel Trilling employed this phrase to describe conservatism when he famously argued 
that liberalism was not only the dominant tradition in America, it was the only tradition.  
See LIONEL TRILLING, THE LIBERAL IMAGINATION:  ESSAYS ON LITERATURE AND SOCIETY, at 
ix (1950). 
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prudence amounted to little more than “ritualized repetition of the 
familiar slogans,”47 but it played to the passions of an electorate that 
was frustrated enough to call for the impeachment of Chief Justice 
Earl Warren.48  This early commotion culminated in originalism—as 
an ism—in the 1970s. 
As the movement matured, these Old Originalists sorted them-
selves into new “original intent” and “original public meaning” 
camps, although the standard narrative overdraws the distinction be-
tween them.  This Subpart traces originalism’s intellectual develop-
ment from the emergence of Old Originalism until it graduated to 
New Originalism.  It is not a comprehensive history, and old and New 
Originalists overlap.  Old Originalist Robert Bork was an advisor to 
Mitt Romney’s 2012 presidential campaign.49  Similarly, Raoul Berger 
continued writing responses until he was almost a century old.50  And 
Michael McConnell is only one example of a “New Originalist” who 
was already new in the 1980s.  Randy Barnett used the term “New 
Originalism” in 1999,51 but Keith Whittington’s important article con-
trasted it with “Old Originalism.”52  These constructs and Whitting-
ton’s descriptive analyses influenced the structure of what follows. 
 
 47 Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1984) (remarking that 
advocates espousing different theories of constitutional interpretation use appealing 
rhetoric to signy their ideological commitments). 
 48 See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five:  A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423, 
439–40 (2004) (“The decisions in Mapp and Miranda were attacked as coddling criminals, 
and the criminal justice system and the Supreme Court had become issues in the upcom-
ing 1968 presidential election. ‘Impeach Earl Warren’ signs appeared along highways in 
most parts of the country.”); see also Elizabeth A. Starrs, Protect Colorado Courts II, 35 COLO. 
LAW. 5, 5 (2006) (describing calls for Chief Justice Warren’s impeachment as “a grass-
roots movement”). 
 49 Lloyd Grove, Robert Bork on Obama, the Supreme Court, Nixon & Being Mitt Romney’s Adviser, 
NEWSWEEK (Oct. 17, 2011, 1:37 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/robert-bork-obama-
supreme-court-nixon-being-mitt-romneys-adviser-68317.  See also Ethan Bronner, A Con-
servative Whose Supreme Court Bid Set the Senate Afire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2012, at A1 (dis-
cussing Bork’s conservative jurisprudence and legacy in the context of his role in the 
Romney campaign). 
 50 Berger was born in 1901.  His last article on HeinOnline is Reflections on Constitutional In-
terpretation, 1997 BYU L. REV. 517 (1997). 
 51 Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 629–54 (1999) 
(describing the ascendancy of New Originalism and arguing for its merit). 
 52 Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 44, at 599–607; see also Keith E. Whittington, Is 
Originalism Too Conservative?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 29, 38–41 (2011) ) [hereinafter 
Whittington, Is Originalism Too Conservative?] (exploring the interplay between conserva-
tive ideology and originalist interpretation). 
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1.  Old Originalism 
The nature of the current project–constructing an understanding 
of originalism by tracing its origins–requires deferring a precise defi-
nition of originalism.  But, at this point in the retelling, it is im-
portant to notice that the stirrings in the 1970s marked the emer-
gence of something new.  This something differed from what came 
before in that it was neither a general milieu of interpretive method 
nor the kind of simple textualism that was practiced in the decades 
prior.  Originalism thus considered–as a movement–began in earnest 
in the 1970s.  It is convenient to refer to this phase, ranging roughly 
from 1970–1990, as “Old Originalism.”53 
It will not surprise many readers that an early contender for 
originalism was Judge Robert Bork.  His 1971 Neutral Principles and 
Some First Amendment Problems stood on the shoulders of Professor 
Herbert Wechsler,54 who was troubled with the rationale of Brown v. 
Board.55  Judge Bork’s article embraced Wechsler’s call for application 
of principles neutral as to the outcome but extended the demand for 
neutrality to the derivation and definition of the principles in the first 
place.  He pointed out that it is no improvement if judges are free to 
pluck their principles from the jurisprudential aether and then de-
fine them so as to suit the judge’s predilections.56  Bork cited Shelly v. 
Kraemer57 and the state reapportionment cases as clear examples of 
non-neutrality, whatever the desirability of their outcomes.58 
Bork’s article did not make much headway on its own,59 even if it is 
now clear that a movement was gathering.60  One scholar, writing sev-
 
 53 See Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 44, at 599 (providing a sketch of the evolu-
tion of originalism, beginning with “old originalism,” that roughly tracks what follows 
herein, though it is less narrative and more abbreviated). 
 54 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2 
(1971) (using Wechsler’s argument about Supreme Court power as a “starting place”). 
 55 Wechsler, supra note 39, at 34 (“[I]s there a basis in neutral principles for holding that 
the Constitution demands that the claims for association should prevail?  I should like to 
think there is, but I confess that I have not yet written the opinion.”). 
 56 Bork, supra note 54, at 7 (advocating for neutral application of principles as well as a neu-
tral definition of those principles in constitutional interpretation). 
 57 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 58 Bork, supra note 54, at 15–19. 
 59 A search for citations to the article in the five years after its publication yields approxi-
mately thirty results.  Of these, many are confined to First Amendment scholarship or are 
bulletins and indexes.  Searches conducted using HeinOnline’s ScholarCheck feature 
four articles citing to “47. Ind. L. J. 1” between 1970 and 1976.  In one, the article is 
miscited and attributed to “Beck.”  S. Mac. Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire of Ju-
rors:  A Constitutional Right, 39 BROOK. L. REV. 290, 310 n.59 (1972). 
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eral years after Bork, suspected at least that Bork’s article was a trickle 
that presaged an imminent flood of debate.61  His prediction was 
borne out almost immediately after it was made.62  In 1976, the case 
was made by someone harder to obscure:  a new Supreme Court Jus-
tice named William H. Rehnquist.63  In submitting Rehnquist’s nomi-
nation, President Nixon had declared that a judge “should not twist 
or bend the Constitution in order to perpetuate his personal political 
and social views.”64  Rehnquist’s articulation, strongly echoing Bork’s, 
looked to the structure of constitutional government as articulated in 
Marbury, recounting the Court’s troubled history in untethered moral 
philosophizing, and making an argument from democratic legitima-
cy.65  Still, Rehnquist was Nixon’s third nominee and so far his cam-
paign promise to initiate a regime of strict construction on the Court 
had been toothless.  It was, after all, Nixon appointee Blackmun who 
wrote the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade.66 
History affords little opportunity to evaluate the impact of Justice 
Rehnquist’s article.  The next year, Raoul Berger released Government 
by Judiciary:  The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment, purporting 
to demonstrate that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did 
not intend to abolish segregation.67  Government by Judiciary renounced 
 
 60 The article is now the tenth most cited law review article of all time.  Fred R. Shapiro & 
Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 
1489 (2012). 
 61 Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 705 (1975) 
(“If the articles by Messrs. Bork, Linde, and Ely mark the emergence of an important 
trend—as I suspect they do—this basic theoretical issue will no longer be swept under the 
rug.”).  Grey’s article was important in prompting a classification of the sides of the de-
bate and in introducing early the idea of an unwritten constitution.  Most of his article is 
taken up observing that interpretivism would undermine many Supreme Court doctrines, 
hardly a dealbreaker for originalists disturbed by judicial overreach.  Id. at 710. 
 62 Of course, Professor Grey may have precipitated the debate with his article.  See infra note 
106 and accompanying text. 
 63 William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 699 (1976) 
(proffering many of the arguments that originalism marshals in its more mature forms). 
 64 President Richard Nixon, Address to the Nation Announcing Intention to  Nominate 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and William H. Rehnquist to be Associate Justices of the Supreme 
Court of the United States (Oct. 21, 1971), in PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE 
U.S.:  RICHARD NIXON 1971, at 1053, 1054 (1972). 
 65 Rehnquist, supra note 63, at 703–06. 
 66 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973) (noting that Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court). 
 67 BERGER, supra note 33, at 18 (“No trace of an intention by the Fourteenth Amendment to 
encroach on State control—for example, of suffrage and segregation—is to be found in the 
records of the 39th Congress.”).  Berger completed the second edition when he was nine-
ty-five years old, and the main text was unaltered “so that readers may in the future have 
before them what excited so much controversy.”  Id. at xxii.  Thus all references in this ar-
ticle are to the second edition, which is available free online at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/675. 
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as unwarranted Brown vs. Board of Education68, what Pamela Karlan lat-
er called the “crown jewel of the United States Reports.”69  Berger’s con-
troversial claim would prove difficult to marginalize and impossible to 
ignore.  His previous books had undermined the Nixon administra-
tion’s attempts at executive insulation, making it implausible to lump 
him in with Nixon and Rehnquist.70  In addition, he was avowedly a 
“deep-dyed liberal and lifelong Democrat.”71  His political dissonance 
with other critics72 of living constitutionalism certainly bought him 
some credibility, but it was his sheer tenacity that made him a verita-
ble force of nature over the next decade. 
“Heresy sometimes becomes so pervasive that it becomes the new 
orthodoxy.”  So wrote Robert Bork from his vantage in 1990.73  This 
may explain why Government by Judiciary “stimulated an explosion of 
academic interest in the framers’ intent,”74 some of which was de-
scribed as “slipshod and semihysterical.”75  The book itself was a com-
pendium of history purporting to show that the Court had distorted 
the Fourteenth Amendment past what its words could bear, arguing 
almost by brute force that the intention of the framers must deter-
mine the meaning of the Constitution.  Responses came from all 
quarters but fall into two general categories.  The first, with which 
 
 68 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 69 Pamela S. Karlan, What Can Brown Do For You?:  Neutral Principles and the Struggle Over the 
Equal Protection Clause, 58 DUKE L.J. 1049, 1060 (2009). 
 70 See generally RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:  A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974); 
RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973). 
 71 Raoul Berger, Robert Bork’s Contribution to Original Intention, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 1167, 1167 
(1990).  Berger added that he was “at the opposite political pole from Bork.”  Id.  Berger 
elsewhere endorsed “the standard political principles of the moderate left of the Demo-
cratic party.”  BERGER, supra note 33, at 336  (quoting Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the 
American Way:  An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 
1307, 1322 (1979)). 
 72 On school prayer he was “diametrically opposed to . . . the Jesse Helms coterie . . . .”  
O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 131 (internal citation omitted). 
 73 BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 29, at 7. 
 74 Richard B. Saphire, Judicial Review in the Name of the Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 745, 
753 (1983). 
 75 Forrest McDonald, Foreword to RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, at xv, xviii (2d 
ed. 1997).  Paul Brest, for example, repeatedly associated Berger with William Winslow 
Crosskey, who in the 1950s published two volumes arguing, among other things, that the 
president had power to enforce state law and that the Supreme Court had common law 
but not judicial review powers.  See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Under-
standing, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 231 (1980) [hereinafter Brest, Misconceived Quest].  The im-
plication is that relying on history can lead to wild aberrations.  But see Ken Kersch, The 
Curious Case of William Winslow Crosskey, Part I, LEGAL HISTORY BLOG (July 14, 2011), 
http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/curious-case-of-william-winslow.html 
(suggesting that Crosskey really was a proto-originalist in the sense of the term used here-
in). 
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this Comment is not concerned, contains arguments that Berger’s 
approach was normatively undesirable and that his conclusions about 
original intent were interesting at best.  These essentially normative 
objections marked out some tentative battle lines between originalists 
and nonoriginalists.76 
The second category shaped the contours of modern originalism 
and thus is relevant for this Comment.  Two scholars have achieved 
iconic status as early and influential critics of Berger. 
Paul Brest was first to arrive at the scene and first to use the term 
“originalism.”77  Brest surveyed the world of originalist ideas, starting 
with the more familiar “textualism,” pointing out that language 
comes with both linguistic and social contexts.78  His critique of inten-
tionalism is much broader.  It identifies the oddity of a lawmaker’s 
mental state governing the scope of a law, the further problem of an-
other party applying that indeterminate intent, the conflict between 
the lawmaker’s intended rules of construction and his intent about 
the enactment, and the problem of group intent.79  Further, in the 
context of our Constitution there is the additional problem of identi-
fying the adopters.80  Unimpressed, Berger called this “Paul Brest’s 
Brief for an Imperial Judiciary.”81  Brest’s critique of originalism high-
lights originalism’s summing or aggregation problem—the difficulty in 
ascertaining the intended meaning of a multimember body. 
Another approach was to meet Berger on his own terms, “trying to 
out-Berger Berger.”82  H. Jefferson Powell wrote an influential83 article 
challenging original intent (or at least Berger’s version of it) on its 
 
 76 E.g., Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy:  The Essential Contradictions of Normative 
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1109 (1981) (concluding that activists like 
himself should “acknowledge that most of our writings are not political theory but advo-
cacy scholarship”). 
 77 Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 75, at 204.  Though the terms “original meaning” and 
the like appear much earlier, originalism as a conceptual neologism appears to originate 
with Brest.  See Solum, supra note 7, at 2. 
 78 Brest, Misconceived Quest, supra note 75, at 205–09 (explaining the bounds of textualism 
used in originalist constitutional interpretation theories). 
 79 Id. at 209–13 (examining the underlying concepts in intentionalism, which uses the 
adopter’s perspective to support constitutional interpretation in contrast to textualism 
and its use of original intent). 
 80 Id. at 213–15. 
 81 Raoul Berger, Paul Brest’s Brief for an Imperial Judiciary, 40 MD. L. REV. 1, 1 (1981). 
 82 Saphire, supra note 74, at 753. 
 83 The influence was inordinate.  See generally Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’ Hermeneutic:  
The Real Original Understanding of Original Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239 (2007) (providing 
historical analysis that seriously undermines Powell). 
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own terms.84  According to Powell, the founding generation was pos-
sessed of two animating forces.  On the one hand, an unlikely alli-
ance between Puritan theology and enlightenment philosophy con-
spired to promote deep distrust of the interpretations of texts.85  
Pulling against this distrust, the common law had developed a robust 
hermeneutic for conducting these kinds of interpretations.86  Examin-
ing the evidence in light of these forces, Powell argued, it becomes 
clear that the founding generation was committed to a hermeneutic 
of objective intent.87  The many instances of resort to legislative or 
drafters’ intent are, upon close examination, really references to ob-
jective intent, a hermeneutic much like that applied to contracts.88  
Thus, goes the argument, those who cast their spear back to the 
founding generation are misunderstanding what they have dragged 
back.  Berger did not lie down—his retribution was swift, and the evi-
dence he marshaled in his response was tedious and relentless.89  
Berger enlisted the usual luminaries such as Coke and Blackstone; 
more effective, though, was his demonstration that Powell’s own 
sources were not up to Powell’s task.  Powell responded at some 
length in reviewing90 Berger’s book91 on federalism.  Berger, worried 
that “victory be ‘adjudged not to him who had Truth on his side; but 
the last word in the Dispute,’” responded in full with “The Founder’s 
Views—According to Jefferson Powell.”92  The episode is typical of 
Berger’s unyielding pugnacity.  His critics were innumerable, so 
much so that one of them remarked that “responding to Berger’s 
thesis has become somewhat of a cottage industry” for scholars.93  
 
 84 H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 
(1985). 
 85 Id. at 888–94. 
 86 Id. at 894–902. 
 87 Id. at 902–24. 
 88 Id. at 948 (“[A]t the time, [intent] referred to the ‘intentions’ of the sovereign parties to 
the constitutional compact, as evidenced in the Constitution’s language and discerned 
through structural methods of interpretation; it did not refer to the personal intentions 
of the framers or of anyone else.”). 
 89 Raoul Berger, “Original Intention” in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 296 
(1986). 
 90 See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1513 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM:  THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN 
(1987)). 
 91 RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM:  THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987). 
 92 Raoul Berger, The Founders’ Views—According to Jefferson Powell, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1034 
(1989) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 494 (P. 
Nidditch ed., 1975) (4th ed. 1700)). 
 93 Saphire, supra note 74, at 753 (noting that “[i]ssuing responses to his critics has become 
somewhat of a cottage industry for Berger” and citing some examples).  
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Berger authored over forty responses,94 leaving the impression that he 
might singlehandedly fend off the academic countermobilization.95  
He was often “quite sharp in print to those with whom he disa-
gree[d]”96 responding vigorously with “relentless collation of quota-
tions”97 to his scholarly critics.  And he was an equal-opportunity 
brawler, answering even his more sympathetic critics.98  The firestorm, 
centered on a man once “a hero to Nixon’s political opponents,”99 
would set the course for originalism’s future.  Berger’s forcefulness 
and ubiquity are a major reason why Old Originalists are identified as 
intentionalists, for Berger is indeed one of the few identifiable com-
mitted intentionalists.100 
Keith Whittington notes that the Old Originalism was marked by 
three characteristics.  First, it was committed to judicial restraint.101  
Originalism was sometimes defended in purely instrumental terms as 
the only way to constrain judges.  This instrumental goal was spurred 
by the intuition that there was something unseemly about judges 
making sweeping national policy, thus leading to the second charac-
teristic:  deference to legislative processes.102  Finally, most important-
ly for the purposes of this Comment, Old Originalists were taken as 
intentionalists.103  Government by Judiciary, like all of Berger’s ubiqui-
tous writings, was a pandect of legislative history and forced the legal 
world to answer to the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
missiles from Brest, Powell, and others naturally honed in on Berger, 
who was happy to engage them with his particular form of intention-
alism. 
 
 94 He compiled a list of his articles which number 114.  See BERGER, supra note 33, 485–91 
(providing a list of the articles).  A search on HeinOnline reveals 136 results with Berger 
as “creator.”  See HEINONLINE, http://heinonline.org (following “Resources” hyperlink; 
then “Law Journal Library” hyperlink; then “advanced search” hyperlink; then inputting 
“Raoul Berger” into the search by author field). 
 95 See BERGER, supra note 33, at xxi–xxii. 
 96 Sanford Levinson, Raoul Berger Pleads for Judicial Activism:  A Comment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 773, 
773 (1996); e.g., Berger, supra note 92, at 1033–34 (“In 1985, Jefferson Powell, then three 
years out of law school, attempted . . . to read ‘original intent’ out of the common law.”). 
 97 Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:  Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 
1485 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM:  THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987)). 
 98 E.g., Raoul Berger, The “Original Intent”—As Perceived by Michael McConnell, 91 NW. U. L. 
REV. 242 (1996).  In typical Berger fashion, his thirty-five-page response has nearly 300 
footnotes.  Id. at 277 (concluding with footnote number 298). 
 99 O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 115. 
100 BERGER, supra note 33, at 403 (arguing for “[e]ffectuation of the draftsman’s intention”). 
101 Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 44, at 602. 
102 Id. at 602–03. 
103 Id. at 603. 
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2.  From Old to New 
Originalism came of age in the mid-1980s.  While some have of-
fered that “[s]o thoroughly did Berger rout his critics that, after a 
decade or so, they virtually stopped trying,”104 it is more plausible to 
say that originalism itself left Berger behind.  Even as the dominance 
of the Warren and Burger Courts passed, Berger’s critics had con-
vinced many sympathetic minds of weaknesses with intentionalism.  
Steady criticism combined with political and judicial gains to pressure 
originalists to refine their theory.  This Subpart briefly recounts 
originalism’s arrival out of the wilderness, or what Professor Balkin 
would call from “off the wall” to “on the wall.”105 
In what must count as at least a minor concession, critics of 
originalism began to pledge fidelity to the text as a first principle; 
criticism of originalism was rooted in “how, not whether, to inter-
pret”106 the Constitution.107  One of these developments is worth not-
ing briefly.  It was in this same period that Bruce Ackerman annunci-
ated the prototype of his concept of “constitutional moments.”108  In 
some ways, Ackerman’s work resonates with the liberals of the pro-
cess-restraint tradition.  Ackerman is hardly a reactionary,109 and his 
work in part justified the New Deal settlement as “the legitimation of 
the activist welfare state.”110  But it did so by appeal to the Constitu-
tion’s actual meaning in order to provide “constitutional vindication 
 
104 McDonald, supra note 75, at xviii. 
105 The use of the phrase in this context comes from Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original 
Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 309–11 (2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Abortion].  The es-
say was adapted as Jack M. Balkin, Fidelity to Text and Principle, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 
2020, at 11 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009); it was popularized in Jack M. Bal-
kin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall:  How the Mandate Challenge Went Mainstream, THE 
ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012, 2:55 PM) http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/
06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/
258040/. 
106 H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 659 n.1 (1987).  Powell 
somewhat emptily accuses originalists of appropriating the term interpretivism for them-
selves, describing it as sheer propaganda.  Although his article does not cite to Grey, it is 
unlikely he was unaware of the source of the label.  Id. 
107 E.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 35 (1985) (“Any recognizable theory of 
judicial review is interpretive . . . .  [The] distinction… between theories that insist on and 
those that reject interpretation . . . is more confusing than helpful.”). 
108 Ackerman, supra note 26, at 1022. 
109 Ackerman has written, among other articles, a liberal manifesto for a “liberal, progressive, 
lefty” magazine.  About Us, AM. PROSPECT, http://prospect.org/about-us;  Bruce Acker-
man, We Answer to the Name of Liberals, AM. PROSPECT (October 22, 2006), http://prospect.
org/article/we-answer-name-liberals-0. 
110 Ackerman, supra note 26, at 1052. 
1548 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:5 
 
[for] the activist welfare state.”111  Against the prevailing Progressive 
narrative, Ackerman agreed with conservatives that the New Deal was 
problematic when measured against the Constitution of 1787 and 
Reconstruction amendments.112  But, he argued, We the People had 
actually and legitimately changed the Constitution through sustained 
engagement.113  Ackerman’s thunderbolt114 meant that originalists 
would have to pay closer attention to constitutional theory—to what 
the Constitution is and why it binds—or risk losing more than just 
their method of interpretation. 
The challenges to originalism pressed adherents to consider more 
closely the concept of intent.  The focus first shifted from framers’ in-
tent to ratifiers’ intent,115 a move that reflected the sentiments of some 
founders116 and also responded to the movement’s critics.117  This re-
finement presaged a more fundamental one:  a shift from subjective 
to objective intent, or from intent to public meaning.  A powerful 
force in this transformation was “original meaning textualism’s pa-
tron saint,”118 Justice Antonin Scalia.  In a 1986 speech, he exhorted 
his audience to “change the label from the Doctrine of Original In-
tent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning” on the premise that “ter-
minology is destiny.”119  As then-Judge Scalia finished his speech with 
 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 1052–53. 
113 Id. at 1055–56. 
114 No claim is presented here as to whether Ackerman considers himself an originalist, 
though he is sometimes taken as one. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 8, at 1849 n.1 (classify-
ing Ackerman as a “broad originalist[]”). 
115 Ronald D. Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the Framers, and the Role of the Ratifiers, 41 
VAND. L. REV. 507, 512 (1988) (“When we talk popularly about the framers’ intent, we re-
ally should be more precise and refer to the ratifiers’ intent . . . .”); M. E. BRADFORD, 
ORIGINAL INTENTIONS:  ON THE MAKING AND RATIFICATION OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 34–86 (1993) (calling attention to the divergent intentions of Massachu-
setts, South Carolina, and North Carolina in ratifying the Constitution) (originally deliv-
ered as a public talk commemorating the bicentennial in 1989); Charles A. Lofgren, The 
Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77, 112 (1988) (“[H]ow the 
ratifiers understood the Constitution . . . defines its meaning.  The act of ratifying cannot 
be dismissed with the adverb ‘merely.’”). 
116 See James Madison in the House of Representatives, April 6, 1796, in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 372, 374 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (“If we were to 
look . . . for the meaning of the instrument beyond [its] face . . . we must look for it, not 
in the General Convention, which proposed, but in the State Conventions, which accept-
ed and ratified the Constitution.”).  
117 See, e.g., Rotunda, supra note 115, at  509 (criticizing the focus on original intent). 
118 Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret 
Drafting History, 91 GEO L.J. 1113, 1139 (2003). 
119 Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on Economic Liber-
ties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986) in ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE:  A 
SOURCEBOOK 101, 106 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice 1987), available at http://babel.hathitrust.
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those words, a senior Reagan advisor symbolically accepted the advice 
on behalf of the Reagan coalition.120  The moment marked “the for-
mal ascendancy of the doctrine of original meaning in modern 
times.”121 
These developments signaled an increasingly complex and coher-
ent network undergirding originalism.  The contemporaneous rise of 
the Federalist Society, an association of conservative law students and 
lawyers, helped make the political and intellectual climate more fa-
vorable for originalism, as did its embrace by the Reagan White 
House.122  Notably, when President Ronald Reagan’s attorney gen-
eral—a political appointee—gave his now-famous speech to the ABA 
calling for “a Jurisprudence of Original Intention,”123 the press124 and 
members of the Supreme Court125 were compelled to respond.  The 
nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court was a “crucial pub-
lic test of originalism”126 that took place in the “bloody cross-
roads . . . where politics and law meet.”127  The lesson for present pur-
poses is that although originalism was not first or primarily a political 
phenomenon, it was both “the instrument and the beneficiary” of 
conservative legal mobilization.128 
 
org/cgi/pt?q1=106;id=mdp.39015019842932;view=1up;seq=122;start=1;size=10;
page=search;num=106#view=1up;seq=122.  
120 See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 
47, 48 n.10 (2006) (recounting Lawson’s memories of the speech, which include T. Ken-
neth Cribb, the Counselor to the Attorney General, accepting Justice Scalia’s recommen-
dation shortly after he finished his speech). 
121 Id. 
122 See generally STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT:  THE 
BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2010). 
123 Edwin Meese III, U.S. Att’y Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 
1985), http://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistory/meese/1985/07-09-1985.pdf, at 7. 
124 See Why Give That Speech?, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1986, at A18. 
125 See Justice William J. Brennan, Speech given at the Georgetown University Text and 
Teaching Symposium (Oct. 12, 1985)(transcript available at  http://www.pbs.org/wnet/
supremecourt/democracy/sources_document7.html). 
126 O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 161. 
127 BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 29, at 269. For insightful explorations of this dimension, see 
O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 133–60 (exploring “Originalism in the Era of Ronald Reagan”); 
Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive:  Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. 
L. REV. 191, 191 (2008) (exploring originalism’s role in the 2008 Supreme Cout decision 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); see also SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE 
CONSTITUTION:  RACE, LABOR, AND CONSERVATIVE POLITICS FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE 
NEW RIGHT (forthcoming) (examining in chapter 14 the tension between Meese’s 
originalism and Solicitor General Fried’s strict constructionism). See generally TELES, supra 
note 122.  
128 Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13 (2009).  Greene does not 
describe the relationship sympathetically. 
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Accounts of originalism’s history often overstate the shift from in-
tent to meaning.  Though there is a discernible trend from intent to 
understanding to public meaning, “the shift . . . was not a clean 
break.”129  The untheorized nature of originalism in these years pre-
cipitated some loose language; intent and meaning are overlapping 
concepts and often used interchangeably.  The next Part examines 
these conceptual problems in greater detail.  A related qualification is 
that the concept of “intent” is by no means absent from modern 
originalism.130  Not all originalists accepted (or accept) the validity of 
the Brest-Powell line of attacks,131 and the supposedly extinct inten-
tionalists persist to this day (though I will call them Low Original-
ists).132  There is an upshot to this chapter, though:  originalism disa-
vows the relevance of anyone’s “secret” intent.  Whatever may have 
been the preference of the early intentionalists, no scholar now advo-
cates “tak[ing] the top off the heads of authors and framers—like 
soft-boiled eggs—to look inside for the truest account of their brain 
states at the moment that the texts were created.”133  Thus, charges 
about the difficulty of examining particular mental states of particu-
lar individuals are averted from the outset. 
3.  Conclusion 
It is fitting to end this story of Old Originalism where it began, 
with Judge Robert Bork.  Bork emblematically stands between the 
Old Originalism and the New Originalism.  An early intellectual fig-
ure in the movement, the Senate’s rejection of his nomination 
marked the confluence of churning social, legal, and political cur-
rents.  Shaped by that tumultuous spectacle, his 1990 book The Tempt-
ing of America provides a useful demarcation line between the eras of 
 
129 Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 Duke L.J. 239, 251 (2009). 
130 Compare Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication:  
Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 230–33 (1988) [hereinafter Kay 
1988] (criticizing the “‘text-by-itself’ idea” as having as “little resemblance to our[]” sys-
tem of governance as “rules inferred from the entrails of sacrificed animals”), with Rich-
ard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. 
L. REV. 703, 704 (2009) [hereinafter Kay 2009] (“[R]ecourse to the original intentions 
provides a link that is essential to the legitimacy of constitutional judicial review.”). 
131 As noted above, Berger’s own arguments were never really answered.  Kay 2009, supra 
note 130, at 705 n.9 (citing Natelson, supra note 83). 
132 Richard Kay is probably the most prominent of these. 
133 Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the “Black Ink” of the Framers’ Intention, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
751, 759 (1987). 
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originalism.134  As to the Old, Bork builds his normative case almost 
entirely on an appeal to judicial restraint.135  Bork’s positive argument 
is abbreviated, more powerful rhetorically than philosophically.  
Marking the transition, Bork is able to write,  
Though I have written of the understanding of the ratifiers of the 
Constitution, since they enacted it and made it law, that is actually a 
shorthand formulation, because what the ratifiers understood them-
selves to be enacting must be taken to be what the public of that time 
would have understood the words to mean.136   
Characteristic of the New, he undertakes a more syllogistic and 
methodological exposition of his theory. 
The story of originalism recounted herein presents a few salient 
details.  First, originalists do not regard originalism as an innovation.  
Rather, it is a spirited expression of what was “the dominant form of 
constitutional interpretation during most of [this] nation’s history.”137  
This lineage is a sort of creation myth138 for originalists.139  But even 
leaving intact that myth, originalists should note that ambitious judg-
es predate Chief Justice Vinson or even the Lochner Court.  Likewise, 
originalism was not alone in its concerns about self-government; stu-
dents and critics alike should regard it as an interlocutor in a broader 
intellectual endeavor.  Democracy and the rule of law are concerns 
for all sides.  While Old Originalists felt compelled to assert these his-
torical bona fides, by 1989 Justice Scalia, with only some exaggera-
tion, could describe originalism as the only game in town with no 
trace of the defensiveness that marked earlier writings.140 
Nevertheless, originalism did arise as a response to the emanation 
of liberal politics from the Supreme Court.  It is unavailing to deny 
originalism’s historical connection to and ideological affinity with po-
 
134 Jack Balkin agrees with this demarcation.  See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Consti-
tutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 446 n.51 (2007) (calling Bork’s book a 
“transitional document between original understanding and original meaning” and 
providing a summary of Bork’s arguments). 
135 Bork makes arguments for the propriety of judicial restraint, but the tenor of the book is 
such that it is clearly a case against naughty judges.  For example, Bork dedicates the first 
130 pages to recounting examples of judicial misconduct throughout all eras of constitu-
tional jurisprudence.  BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 29, at 1–132. 
136 Id. at 144. 
137 Executive Summary in ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE:  A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 118, 
at i. 
138 The term is not pejorative.  For a perspective on myth as truth, see C. S. Lewis, Myth Be-
came Fact, in GOD IN THE DOCK:  ESSAYS ON THEOLOGY AND ETHICS 63, 64–67 (Walter 
Hooper ed., 1970).  See also J.R.R. Tolkien, Mythopoeia, in TREE AND LEAF (1989). 
139 Appeals to The Federalist, Chief Justice Marshall, Joseph Story, etc., are legion.  One can 
choose almost any originalist work cited herein and find an example. 
140 Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 855 (1989). 
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litical conservatism.141   The charge that this imperils the originalist 
argument is a kind of collective ad hominem or “Bulverism,”142 ad-
dressing the motives of the argument’s proponents rather than the 
argument itself.143  It is, however, a prerequisite for credible and con-
structive dialogue that originalists admit this fact.  As the conversation 
continued into the 1990s, libertarians144 and progressives145 crafted 
their own originalist theories.  Thus, the strict identification with con-
servative politics has become more of a loose correlation. 
II.  NEW ORIGINALISM – A SYSTEMATIC JURISPRUDENCE: HIGH 
ORIGINALISM AND LOW ORIGINALISM 
With the passing of the Old Originalism–reactive and restraintist, 
a loyal opposition–came a “boon tide of originalist scholarship”146 that 
makes it impractical to continue the historian’s approach of the pre-
vious section.147 
Originalism, no longer off the wall, found itself a fledgling theory 
in a big legal world.  Originalists responded by growing, adapting, 
evolving—a development some critics considered ironic given 
originalism’s commitment to historical meaning.148  Michael 
McConnell, who would become “undoubtedly the most prominent 
New Originalist,”149 warned against stultification in a review of Raoul 
Berger’s book.150  McConnell criticized Berger’s work as “radically in-
complete” and “fail[ing] to link[] discoveries about the issue at hand 
to any overarching understanding of the . . . Constitution.”151  
McConnell was an early adopter of New Originalism, sensing the 
 
141 See Whittington, Is Originalism Too Conservative?, supra note 52, at 29 (noting that original-
ism is often linked to conservative politics). 
142 See C. S. LEWIS, ‘Bulverism’, in GOD IN THE DOCK 271, 273 (Walter Hooper ed., 1970) 
(“[Y]ou must show that a man is wrong before you start explaining why he is wrong.  The 
modern method is to assume without discussion that he is wrong and then distract his at-
tention from this (the only real issue) by busily explaining how he became so silly.”). 
143 Cf. Whittington, Is Originalism Too Conservative?, supra note 52, at 34 n.13 (discussing an 
argument about judicial and political behavior). 
144 Most notably, Randy Barnett. 
145 E.g., Jack M. Balkin. 
146 Barnett, supra note 51, at 650.  The meaning of the term “boon tide” is itself a mystery. 
147 A summary with useful citations appears in Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 118, at 1140–
41. 
148 See, e.g., Colby & Smith, supra note 129, at 246 (“Originalists, who have long criticized the 
notion of a living constitution, have themselves followed a living, evolving approach to 
constitutional interpretation.”). 
149 Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 44, at 608. 
150 McConnell, supra note 97. 
151 Id. at 1485–86. 
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need to connect originalism to a broader moral and political narra-
tive. 
In order to answer this normative challenge, originalism faced its 
greatest methodological challenge.  Clearly the Constitution does not 
answer every question our politics raises.  If judges should not engage 
in moral reasoning or rule based on well-reasoned policy conclusions, 
how then should they determine the Constitution’s meaning where it 
is silent, ambiguous, or the application of the text runs out?  In a 
1989 survey of originalism, one commentator observed that 
“[t]houghtful originalists . . . concede that factors other than original 
intent must be given some weight in decisions.”152 
As a preliminary matter, several unfamiliar concepts must enter 
the discussion.  First, this Part presents a diversity of originalist theo-
ries, a diversity that has convinced some that “the inconsistency of 
originalism—the incoherence of the movement—runs much deeper.  
And it always has.”153  Though originalists disagree on much, and 
though there is no official gatekeeper, all of them hold what Law-
rence Solum has dubbed the fixation thesis.154  The fixation thesis 
states that the semantic meaning—as distinguished from the applica-
tive meaning (what does the new tax code mean for my bottom line?) 
and the teleological meaning (the meaning of life, the meaning of a 
fence newly erected between neighbors)—of a text is fixed at the time 
of enactment.155  A second concept is “speaker’s meaning,” especially 
as contrasted with “sentence meaning.”156  The distinction is a matter 
of complex philosophy of language, but for present purposes the 
speaker’s meaning implicates the author or speaker in determining 
the semantic content of the utterance.  It is closely related to the idea 
of intentions.  Sentence meaning, in contrast, is determined by re-
solving “the words and phrases that constitute the utterance.”157  The 
source of the words is irrelevant to determining their meaning. 
With these concepts in hand, this Part will undertake a more sys-
tematic survey of originalism as it stands now in the midst of original-
ism’s “Thirty Years War.”158  The scholarly conversation has reflected a 
deficient taxonomy that has wasted resources, in part by discussing a 
 
152 Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate:  A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 
1105 (1989). 
153 Colby & Smith, supra note 129, at 249. 
154 Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 2 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series, No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1120244. 
155 Id. at 2–3. 
156 Id. at 34. 
157 Id. at 35. 
158 Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 118, at 1135. 
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type of originalism–original methods originalism–that no one holds.  
Instead, the thesis of this Part is that the degree to which the “speak-
er’s meaning” is a relevant concept is the appropriate dividing line 
between two camps within originalism. 
A.  How Not To Divide 
The previous Part described the shift from “original intent” to 
“original public meaning” as a historical matter.  This move is best 
regarded not as an abandonment of original intent, but as a clarifica-
tion as to which intent, or whose intent, is the object of the inquiry.  
The overlap and conflation of these two concepts has caused no end 
of trouble for originalists and their critics.  The reason is partly histor-
ic, described above, but also partly owes to an underconceptualized 
account of the various flavors of originalism.  In order to get an idea 
of the contours of modern originalism, it is useful to turn to a locus 
classicus of originalism and examine the exchange between two emi-
nent legal scholars. 
In the year 1997, originalism was ascendant enough that a consti-
tutional historian could declare that “the turn to originalism seems so 
general that citation is almost beside the point.”159  The same year, 
Princeton University’s Tanner Lecture featured Justice Antonin Scal-
ia as its keynote speaker with comments by eminent scholars:  histori-
an Gordon Wood, constitutional law professor and litigator Laurence 
Tribe, comparative constitutional scholar Mary Ann Glendon, and 
renowned legal theorist Ronald Dworkin.  The lectures were adapted 
to print as A Matter of Interpretation.160  The exchange between Justice 
Scalia and Ronald Dworkin sends us on our way.  Justice Scalia pre-
sented a familiar defense of originalism as the opening lecture: 
[W]e do not really look for subjective legislative intent.  We look for a 
sort of “objectified” intent—the intent that a reasonable person would 
gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the 
corpus juris. . . . [I]t is simply incompatible with democratic govern-
ment . . . to have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver 
meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated . . . .  It is the law 
that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.161 
 
159 Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (Or To It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587, 1592 n.14 
(1997). 
160 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1997). 
161 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:  The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
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Dworkin observed that Justice Scalia often repairs to legislative in-
tent or purpose in avoiding “silly” consequences.162  Dworkin observed 
that there are two types of originalism based on the intention that 
one might seek.163  The first is semantic originalism, which seeks the 
semantic intention or what the lawmakers “intended to say in enact-
ing the language they used.”164  The second is expectation original-
ism, which holds that the text “should be understood to have the 
consequences that those who made them expected them to have.”165  
Justice Scalia embraced Dworkin’s distinction and pledged fealty to 
semantic originalism.166  Here Dworkin identified a first useful distinc-
tion:  the conflation of semantic intention and expectation inten-
tion.167 
But Dworkin completely missed a second distinction:  Justice Scal-
ia’s finer point about the applicative scope of a semantically fixed 
meaning as compared with a principle whose meaning is subject to 
change.168  It is easier to demonstrate this with their example:  the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punish-
ment.”169  Justice Scalia’s position is that the death penalty cannot fall 
within the meaning of the Amendment because the framers obviously 
countenanced its use.  Dworkin pointed out that Justice Scalia must 
choose between two translations170 of the text:  either it prohibits 
“punishments generally thought cruel at the time” or it “lay[s] down 
an abstract principle forbidding whatever punishments are in fact 
cruel and unusual.”171  Justice Scalia called the first alternative a cari-
cature of his position and averred that the Amendment is indeed an 
abstract moral principle but it is one whose content is fixed at its enact-
 
162 Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 115, 115–16 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Dworkin, Comment]. 
163 Id. at 119. 
164 Id. at 116. 
165 Id. at 119. 
166 See Scalia, Response, supra note 36, at 144 (agreeing with Dworkin’s conception of “seman-
tic intention” and claiming to follow it). 
167 Justice Scalia and Dworkin may have been too hasty to agree that semantic intention is 
irrelevant.  Semantic intention may implicate speaker’s meaning which may be relevant to 
interpretation. 
168 I discovered that Michael McConnell beat me to this observation by fifteen years.  Mi-
chael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review:  A Comment on Ronald 
Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1284 (1997) (de-
scribing Dworkin’s “familiar fallacy of black and white reasoning”). 
169 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
170 Dworkin has in mind a sophisticated philosophical notion of translation, though his 
footnote here states in its entirety “[r]eference to work of Quine, Grice, and Davidson.”  
Dworkin, Comment, supra note 162, at 117 n.6. 
171 Id. at 120. 
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ment.172  Because Justice Scalia then inferred that meaning from the 
presence of capital punishment in eighteenth-century America, Pro-
fessor Dworkin accused him of resorting to the caricature he just dis-
owned.173  But Justice Scalia explicitly disclaimed the dichotomy and 
argued that the moral principle is in the text and derives its meaning 
from the original period.  Thus it applies “to all sorts of tortures quite 
unknown at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted.”174  The 
electric chair is perhaps an example—Justice Scalia is not rendered 
speechless because the founding generation had literally no opinion 
on it.  There is, then, a difference between what a phrase—even an ab-
stract one—means at the time of enactment and how its enactors 
would expect it to apply.175 
Old Originalism’s debate over intent and meaning maps onto this 
exchange, but here we view the overlapping concepts at a higher res-
olution.  The idea of “intent” implicates semantic intent (what a 
speaker intended to say) as much as it does expectation intent (what 
a speaker intended his statement to accomplish).  And, though not 
explicitly, a closer look clarifies the role of abstraction.  If a statement 
is designedly an abstract principle, does that license future receivers 
to interpret it according to how their generation uses the words?  
Dworkin conflates “dated” with “concrete”176:  to say a principle is ab-
stract does not require saying that it is also evolving or relative.  How 
the original authors anticipated the law would apply—the original ex-
pected applications—is irrelevant in resolving the meaning of the text.  
Dworkin’s description of Justice Scalia was thus more than caricature.  
Anyone who used original expectations in that way would reduce 
“principle” beyond even the status of “category” to mere “sets” or 
“aggregations.”177  Words, on this account, would be useful only to de-
 
172 Scalia, Response, supra note 36, at 145 (“What it abstracts . . . is not a moral principle of 
‘cruelty’ that philosophers can play with in the future, but rather the existing society’s as-
sessment of what is cruel.”). 
173 See Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity:  Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1256–57 (1997) (describing Justice Scalia’s arguments and argu-
ing that “they endorse exactly the view that Justice Scalia . . . had rejected as caricature”). 
174 Scalia, Response, supra note 36, at 145. 
175 See McConnell, supra note 168, at 1284 (“Mainstream originalists recognize that the 
Framers’ analysis of particular applications could be wrong, or that circumstances could 
have changed and made them wrong.”).  But see Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The 
Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO L.J. 569 (1998) (making an extended case for 
Dworkin’s dichotomy). 
176 Dworkin, Comment, supra note 162, at 121–22 (categorizing “concrete [and] dated rules ” 
together). 
177 See Steven D. Smith, Reply to Koppelman:  Originalism and the (Merely) Human Constitution, 27 
CONST. COMMENT. 189, 195 (2010) (“Imagine an interpretive approach that tried to es-
chew ‘principles’ and categories in favor of some sort of radical nominalism in which 
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scribe a specific set of intended objects.  The incoherence and im-
practicability of this position would hardly evade a first-year law stu-
dent, let alone a lawyer of Justice Scalia’s caliber. 
Either through ellipsis or carelessness, originalists may sometimes 
sound like they are relying on original expected applications.178  But 
the notion of an “original-expected-applications originalism” as a 
theoretical variant appears to be a construct of critics.179  Lawrence 
Rosenthal’s recent article is an excellent example.  In purporting to 
show that originalism in theory and in practice devolves to non-
originalism, Rosenthal provides a rough sketch of originalist camps.  
He first cuts the originalist world in half, dividing it between “‘origi-
nal-expected-applications’ originalism” and “semantic originalism.”180  
The discussion of the first is curiously lacking in citations to any of its 
theorists.  Rosenthal charges Justice Scalia as such181 but then con-
cedes that he is a semantic originalist.182  In the introduction to the 
section, Rosenthal names John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport as 
of a similar stripe,183 but fails to discuss their original-methods 
originalism in the article.184  His other category—semantic original-
ism—comprises, I suggest, the entirety of originalist thought.  Rosen-
thal divides this world into liberal, libertarian, and conservative.185  
There is something to this division, since a scholar’s normative com-
 
words are understood to refer not to universals or real categories, but only to the particu-
lar items or instances contemplated by the person uttering the words. . . . On this assump-
tion, constitutional interpretation would be impossible.”). 
178 E.g., Justice Scalia’s remarks that the death penalty was prevalent and thus could not have 
been prohibited. 
179 Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1190 (2012); see also Mitch-
ell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two About Abortion), 24 
CONST. COMMENT. 383, 390 (2007) (“[A] surprising number of other smart and careful 
scholars appear to believe, just as Balkin does, that expectation originalism enjoys vibrant 
support.”) (citing as examples KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
47–58 (2006) and Aileen Kavanagh, Original Intention, Enacted Text, and Constitutional In-
terpretation, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 255, 265 (2002)). 
180 Rosenthal, supra note 179, at 1189. 
181 Id. at 1191. 
182 Id. at 1210. 
183 Id. at 1191. 
184 See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism:  A New Theory 
of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009) (defending 
their “original methods orginalism”). 
185 Rosenthal, supra note 179, at 1213–32 (discussing the three types of semantic original-
ism). 
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mitments necessarily motivate him to different goals.186  Nevertheless, 
the next Subpart pursues a different classification. 
B.  A Better Taxonomy 
The stark divide between semantic originalism and original-
expected-applications originalism is illusory.  But this is not to say that 
originalist theories do not differ in significant ways.  At risk of enlist-
ing in the “small army of eager bouncers”187 that polices the bounda-
ries of originalism, this Comment proposes a different taxonomy, one 
that is politics-blind.  Instead, originalism is roughly divided between 
“High Originalists” and “Low Originalists.”  The High Originalists 
engage in abstractions and seek a kind of theoretical purity.  Low 
Originalists take a more natural or organic approach to interpreta-
tion.  High Originalists reject speaker’s meaning; Low Originalists 
think that is impossible or unwise. 
As with any intellectual taxonomy, there are degrees of separation 
with overlap and migration along the spectrum.  But in contrast to 
the prevailing division based on expectations, or the political taxon-
omy Rosenthal employs, this one accounts for Jack Balkin as easily as 
it accounts for Michael McConnell.  I will even claim to explain the 
judicial riddle known as Justice Antonin Scalia. 
1.  The High Originalists 
We begin with the High Originalists.  At this end of the spectrum 
are those who adhere to a purer form of textual originalism.  This 
mode of interpretation is called “semantic originalism”188 and is 
commonly identified with “New Originalism.”189  On these models, 
the product of the legislative process—the law—takes on an almost pla-
tonic status.190  Once it takes its place in the code, an interpreter as-
 
186 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial Activism:  A 
Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1085 (2005) (charging Barnett 
with allowing his libertarian politics to skew his constitutional analysis). 
187 Andrew Koppelman, Why Jack Balkin is Disgusting, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 177, 177 (2010). 
188 The term seems to have originated with Dworkin as discussed above.  See supra notes 162–
67 and accompanying text. 
189 E.g., Rosenthal, supra note 179, at 1210 (“Semantic originalism . . . is sometimes referred 
to as the ‘New Originalism.’”); Lawson & Seidman, supra note 120, at 48–49 (asserting 
that “the weight of originalist opinion today” employs an objective reasonable person 
standard).  
190 E.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 
104 YALE L.J. 541, 552 (1994) (observing that originalists “give priority to [the plain dic-
tionary meaning] . . . because it and it alone is law”). 
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certains its meaning only by engaging a technical linguistic analysis.  
Exponents of this view call for a reasonable person analysis, though 
that reasonable person may be “an ordinary user of the language”191 
or “a skilled user of words”192 or even “the reasonable person of the 
law.”193  The search for this meaning starts in contemporaneous dic-
tionaries and grammar books and consults public statements only for 
additional evidence.194  Contracts professor-cum-constitutional scholar 
Randy Barnett, among others,195 offers a defense of this model based 
on the Constitution’s writtenness.196  Barnett applies to the Constitu-
tion the four functions of formality in contract—evidentiary, caution-
ary, channeling, and clarifying—and shows that all apply to a written 
constitution.197  These are at best consequentialist reasons for adher-
ing to the text, a weakness Barnett senses as he then vindicates the 
Constitution’s writtenness with political theory.198  Other semantic 
originalists legitimate the method in more lawyerly terms.199 
Larry Solum defends this position in abstruse philosophical detail, 
in what has been called “the outstanding manifestation” of a “highly 
theoretical enterprise.”200  Solum declares that “[w]hen we seek the 
meaning of a legal text . . . our aim is to discover the conventional 
semantic meaning of the expression type and to resolve vagueness 
and ambiguity by reference to context of the particular utterance to-
ken.”201  The work is dense and unpolished, introducing a plethora of 
concepts from the philosophy of language that are too complex to 
recount here.  A notable aspect of Solum’s work—and one that marks 
him out as a High Originalist—is his insistence that semantic original-
ism is purely descriptive:  the text has an objective meaning as a mat-
 
191 Id. at 554. 
192 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 Harv. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 59, 61 (1988). 
193 Lawson & Seidman, supra note 120, at 73.  The reasonable person construct here is ex-
plicitly a “formidable intellectual figure.”  Id. 
194 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 190, at 552–53. 
195 E.g., id. at 552 (listing Professor Akhil Reed Amar, Robert Bork, Professor John Hary Ely, 
and Justice Antonin Scalia as endorsers of this methodology). 
196 Randy E. Barnett, supra note 51, at 629–54.  Barnett makes the same arguments in his 
book, RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY (2004). 
197 Barnett,  supra note 51, at 630–31. 
198 Id. at 636–43. 
199 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 119, at 51–70 (dissecting Chief Justice Marshall’s into-
nation that “we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding” as it relates 
to the meaning of the Constitution and constitutional interpretation (quoting McCulloch 
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)). 
200 Smith, supra note 177, at 198, 198 n.29. 
201 Solum, supra note 154, at 33. 
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ter of logic.202  Whether we should use that meaning is of course a 
normative question, but the claim is that determining the meaning is 
in this sense a highly rationalist endeavor.  Solum explicitly concludes 
that speaker’s meaning (framer’s meaning in the constitutional con-
text) is impossible and thus only the sentence meaning (clause mean-
ing) can succeed.203 
Joining the New Originalists is a merry band of heterodox 
originalists.204  Spurred in part by an appropriation of neorepublican 
historical scholarship,205 political liberals have developed their own 
versions of originalism.206  Dworkin advanced a “moral reading” of the 
Constitution rooted firmly in his understanding of semantic original-
ism,207 even as he claimed “opposition to any form of originalism.”208  
Dworkin is a prolific scholar209—his interpretive method is of a piece 
with his concept of “law as integrity”210 and building a complete ac-
count of Dworkin’s theory is quite difficult.211  He speaks in places of 
constitutional text as a speech act conforming to speaker’s meaning 
theory, though he seems to allow this contextual reading to influence 
the meaning of the text only in limited circumstances.212  Dworkin 
thus advocates a version of High Originalism in which text that uses 
value-laden terms becomes an evolving moral principle for judges to 
apply. 
 
202 Id. at 8. 
203 Id. at 41–50. 
204 See William Hogeland, Founding Fathers, Founding Villains:  The New Liberal Originalism, 
BOS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 2012,  available at http://www.bostonreview.net/us/founding-
fathers-founding-villains-william-hogeland (describing the positions and arguments of 
modern liberal originalists). 
205 Key figures are Bernard Bailyn and his principle students Jack Rakove and Gordon S. 
Wood. 
206 See O’NEILL, supra note 5, 198–205, 213–15 (describing developments in liberal original-
ism).  The strategy was at least partially self-conscious.  See generally LAURA KALMAN, THE 
STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996); Laura Kalman, Border Patrol:  Reflections on 
the Turn to History in Legal Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87 (1997). 
207 RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW:  THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION (1996). 
208 Dworkin, supra note 173, at 1258 n.18  
209 Dworkin is the second most-cited legal scholar in the twentieth century.  See Fred R. 
Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 424 (2000) (listing Dworkin 
as the second most-cited legal scholar behind Richard A. Posner). 
210 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 94 (1986). 
211 See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Dworkin as an Originalist, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 49 (2000) (at-
tempting to parse out Dworkin’s changing arguments concerning originalism); see also 
McConnell, supra note 168, at 1270 (“It is not too much to say that there are two 
Dworkins . . . .”). 
212 See Ronald Dworkin, Reflections on Fidelity, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1799, 1816 (1997) (analyz-
ing a case in terms of “speech practice”). 
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There are many others,213 but Jack Balkin is the most conspicuous 
heterodox originalist.  Playing to the same ambiguity Dworkin ex-
ploits, Balkin famously declared his commitment to “the method of 
text and principle” in a 2007 article.214  Balkin’s method looks quite sim-
ilar to Dworkin’s:  where Dworkin finds an abstract moral principle, 
Balkin sees a “framework” that “delegate[s] the articulation and im-
plementation of important constitutional principles to the fu-
ture[.]”215  Professor Balkin sounds not unlike Randy Barnett or even 
Justice Antonin Scalia in arguing for originalism from principles of 
writtenness, popular sovereignty, and fidelity to custom and nation 
alike.216  And the hermeneutic of text and principle is a thoroughgo-
ing originalist enterprise, traceable from John Marshall217 through 
Robert Bork218 to Justice Scalia.219  The road seems safe, the way famil-
iar–Balkin is not merely calling himself an originalist and then doing 
something else.  Balkin deftly and cannily employs High Originalism 
to reach the conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment enshrines a 
right to abortion in the Constitution.220 
The High Originalists are characterized by a highly systematic ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation, an aspiration to “a theory 
working itself pure.”221  On the premise that “documents can have 
meanings that are latent in their language and structure even if they 
are not obvious to observers at a specific moment in time,”222 the the-
ory avoids looking at individuals or communities in favor of an objec-
tive meaning of utterances.  But it is also marked by an unsettling 
range of outcomes.  Some High Originalists reach conclusions typi-
 
213 See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE (1998); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION:  THE 
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL 
CONSTITUTION (1993); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 
(1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311 (1996). 
214 Balkin, Abortion, supra note 105, at 293. 
215 Jack M. Balkin, supra note 134, at 453. 
216 Id. at 428–42. 
217 M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (“That this idea was enter-
tained by the framers of the American constitution, is not only to be inferred from the 
nature of the instrument, but from the language.”). 
218 BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 29, at 146–53 (applying the principle of judicial neutrality). 
219 Scalia, Response, supra note 36, at 145 (arguing that the Eighth Amendment is “rooted in 
the moral perceptions of the time”). 
220 Balkin, Abortion, supra note 105, at 299–300 (“[E]qual rights for women are fully con-
sistent with the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and its underlying prin-
ciples of equal citizenship and opposition to caste and class legislation.”). 
221 Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 118, at 1114. 
222 Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 341 n.51 (2002). 
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cally associated with originalism.223  Others, though, conclude their 
systematization with perplexing results, ranging from a constitutional 
presumption of liberty224 to two different constitutional rights to abor-
tion.225 
2.  The Low Originalists 
Looking on aghast from the other pole are the Low Originalists. 
The term is not pejorative–indeed, the tenor of this Comment is that 
the Low Originalists have the better position.  It also should not be 
taken to suggest a lower degree of academic or logical rigor.  Low 
Originalism means an interpretive model that accords some level of 
relevance to speaker’s meaning or intent. The reason I do not label 
them “intentionalists” is to distinguish them from that strand of Old 
Originalism.  Low Originalists do not seek private meanings, but they 
do look at the constitutional text as an act of human communication. 
Some Low Originalists are designedly simplistic.  Steven D. Smith 
offers a representative position.  Acknowledging that he risks being 
charged with “obscurantism, anti-intellectualism, and yokelism,”226 he 
boldly proceeds to criticize the mess high theory has made of 
originalism.  Himself an “originalist wannabe,”227 he is nevertheless 
deeply troubled by what has become of originalist theory.228  In his es-
timation, it has become that which it beheld, a writ for unrestrained 
judicial activism.  Elsewhere, Smith frames the debate in broader ide-
ological terms, lamenting the perfectionist tendencies among 
originalists.229  That Balkin is able to reasonably (if cleverly) declare 
himself an originalist is a product of removing the Constitution from 
the realm of human affairs.230  This broader cultural point can be 
made at great length; here it will have to suffice to mention that it is 
 
223 E.g., Calabresi, supra note 186, at 1097 (accusing Barnett of being unrealistic and “over-
look[ing] some important originalist and normative arguments about judicial activism”. 
224 See generally BARNETT, supra note 196. 
225 Balkin, Abortion, supra note 105, at 319–36 (discussing arguments for the right to abortion 
from due process and the privileges or immunities clauses). 
226 Smith, supra note 3, at 223; see also Larry Alexander, Simple-minded Originalism, in THE 
CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM:  THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 87 (Grant 
Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). 
227 Steven D. Smith, The Writing of the Constitution and the Writing on the Wall, 19 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 391, 391 (1996). 
228 Smith, supra note 3, at 224–27. 
229 See Smith, supra note 177, at 192–93 (describing as naïve originalists’ belief “that their 
approach to interpretation ‘purges adjudication of discretion’ and that it delivers ‘fixity 
and determinacy’” (internal citations omitted)). 
230 Id. at 190–91. 
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typically nonoriginalists who sought this kind of transcendence.231  
Like Daedalus of myth, High Originalists aspire to heavenly places; 
the Constitution, though, is a human artifice. 
A more philosophical case is available for speaker’s meaning or 
Low Originalism.  The notion of a text standing above and outside 
any authorship is counterintuitive.  An important article by Larry Al-
exander and Saikrishna Prakash identifies five different ways in which 
the reading of texts is impossible without inferring intent.232  Given 
the impossibility of intentions-free interpretation, the article suggests 
that High Originalism’s real problems stem from questions of eviden-
tiary reliability or of constructing an idealized author.233 
Elsewhere, proudly claiming the mantle of “simple-minded” 
originalist, Alexander presents a useful illustration.234  Imagine a per-
son hands you a piece of paper and tells you that he has to follow the 
commands thereon.235  If he tells you that the paper fell from a mov-
ing vehicle and the marks are dirt and the like, you will have to con-
clude that there are no normative propositions on the paper.236  If he 
tells you that the paper was given him by some authority to which he 
was bound, you will want to know who the authors are and in what 
language they communicated.237 
Resonating with these linguistic arguments, the arch-Low 
Originalist Richard Kay launches a multipronged attack on High 
Originalism.238  Like Alexander and Prakash, Kay challenges the con-
cept of constitutional communication that underlies High Originalist 
theory, as well as the “supposed invulnerability” to the aggregation 
and original methods objections.239  As a response to these early criti-
cisms, then, High Originalism unnecessarily cedes ground.240  Kay fur-
ther notes that High and Low Originalism will often yield the same 
conclusions, but that when the models diverge, High Originalism 
misleads the interpreter.241  Coming full circle in this outline of Low 
 
231 Id. 
232 Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?”  Why Intention Free 
Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 972–82 (2004) (outlining and 
explaining the five arguments). 
233 Id. at 982–89. 
234 Alexander, supra note 225, at 87. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 88. 
238 Kay 1988, supra note 130. 
239 Kay 2009, supra note 130, at 707. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. at 704, 714–19 (showing “that reliance on public meaning distracts the interpreter 
from the connection between the normative force of the Constitution and the founding 
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Originalism, Kay demonstrates that High Originalism “leads to an en-
larged range of plausible outcomes.”242  Imagine the power and range 
of a judge equipped with Jack Balkin’s method, and even a fraction of 
his acumen! 
Low Originalism calls for understanding the Constitution as an 
inherently human enterprise, written in the actual language of an ac-
tual people.  It rejects the metaphysical subtleties of High Originalism 
along with the sundry forms of nonoriginalism. 
C.  The Crisis of High Originalism 
Interpretive theory is primarily concerned with what to do when 
the text is underdetermined—when its meaning runs out before it can 
resolve the case at hand.  High Originalism appears to be particularly 
susceptible to this infirmity, coming under criticism from historians 
and legal theorists alike.  One eminent historian, himself quite in-
vested in what our foundational documents mean, details what he 
calls the “poverty of public meaning originalism.”243  And a prominent 
originalist scholar writes of the “impossibility” of “intention free in-
terpretation.”244  This weakness of High Originalism is straining the 
denomination’s standing. 
Some look for traction in distinguishing between interpretation 
and construction.245  “Construction” may mean the development of 
constitutional norms within an existing framework, which readers will 
recognize as the basis of all constitutional law curriculum.246  But the 
concept can be simply the science of judicial application and the 
rules that courts adduce to guide them in their work.  This only re-
states the problem, if with more clarity:  where should a judge look 
when the text admits of two interpretations that would resolve the 
case differently? 
 
events, whereas recourse to the original intentions provides a link that is essential to the 
legitimacy of constitutional judicial review”). 
242 Id. at 704. 
243 Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, the Poverty of Public Meaning 
Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575 (2011). 
244 Alexander & Prakash, supra note 231. 
245 Barnett and Solum endorse the distinction.  McGinnis and Rappaport reject it.  Whitting-
ton uses the terms somewhat differently.  As I explain below, Whittington is probably a 
Low Originalist. 
246 Whittington uses the term this way.  See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 35–36 (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION]; see also KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION:  
DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999). 
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A forthcoming article takes us back to the earliest days of the re-
public to explore the question.  Donald Drakeman and Joel Alicea 
look at the very early case of Hylton v. United States247 and find the Jus-
tices running headlong into this problem almost immediately.248  Af-
ter recounting the fascinating history of an early challenge to Con-
gress’s taxing power, the article exhausts the sources admissible to a 
High Originalist:  dictionaries, grammars, highly-publicized usages.  
At the end of their thorough undertaking, the article’s two authors, 
like the Justices in 1796, cannot agree on the objective meaning of 
the term “excise.”249  The Justices must go beyond public-meaning 
sources and consult such low affairs as ratifying conventions and 
statements by contemporary lawmakers.  The article concludes that 
“New Originalism” is inherently limited, and when its meaning runs 
out, it is useful to resort to “Old Originalism.”250  The substance of the 
conclusion is exactly right, but the labels are misleading and unhelp-
ful.  What we know as New Originalism comprises both High and Low 
Originalists, so the fault illuminated by Hylton is not properly laid at 
its feet.  It is High Originalism that leads to a dead-end, and the es-
cape is in the Low Originalism of today, not the untheorized inten-
tionalism of the past. 
Another chief criticism of originalism is that it is just as “activist” as 
the theories it seeks to displace.  This line of attack also comes from 
within and from without.  Robert Post and Reva Siegel—certainly no 
reactionaries—have written that originalism is no less the fruit of pop-
ular constitutional impulses than any other theory.251  Originalism’s 
 
247 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
248 Joel Alicea & Donald Drakeman, The Limits of the New Originalism, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. LAW 
1162, 1163 (2013) (noting that the Hylton case might “be far more important for its les-
sons in originalism” because “[w]ith no clear precedents either on the tax issue itself or, 
more importantly, how judicial review should be done, the advocates in the 
case . . . battled over how to interpret the Constitution”). 
249 Id. at 1206–14; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598 (2012) 
(using the ambiguity of tax issues to avoid careful definition of types of taxes). 
250 Alicea & Drakeman, supra note 248, at 1218–19. 
251 See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 
2020, at 25, 26 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (demonstrating “that claims 
of originalism asserted in the late twentieth century expressed such a substantive and 
mobilizing constitutional vision”); Robert Post & Reva B. Siegel, Originalism as a Political 
Practice:  The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 546 (2006) (“Originalism 
remains even now a powerful vehicle for conservative mobilization, as can clearly be seen 
in recent popular opposition to the citation of foreign law.”); Siegel, supra note 127, at 
192–94 (arguing that the “practices of democractic constitutionalism enable mobilized 
citizens to contest and shape popular beliefs about the Constitution’s original meaning 
and so confer upon courts the authority to enforce the nation’s foundational commit-
ments in new ways”). 
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most visible internal conflict is over the degree to which the Constitu-
tion licenses courts to override majoritarian decision-making.  An in-
creasingly strident band of libertarian originalists argues for an ex-
pansive, liberty-preserving originalism under which judges must 
“engage” rather than “abdicate.”  More traditionalist conservatives 
view this as a call for outright activism in a libertarian guise.252  An 
icon of the conservative judiciary, Judge Harvie Wilkinson, observed 
that originalism allows the judge to enact his own policy preferences 
no less than other interpretive models.253  Likewise, Nelson Lund, a 
well-known conservative scholar, wrote that “[t]he challenge for 
originalist theory . . . is to distinguish genuinely originalist interpreta-
tions from those that amount to living constitutionalism or judicial 
deferentialism dressed up in originalist clothing.”254  Professor Lund 
calls for a “conscientious originalism,” but his description of it is per-
fectly orthodox Low Originalism:  “When the text does not supply an 
adequately precise answer, a conscientiously originalist court has no 
choice but to decide the issue in light of the purpose of the provision 
as that purpose was understood by those who adopted it.”255 
Jamal Greene, a critical observer of originalism, seems to agree 
with this Comment’s diagnosis of High Originalism’s flagging 
strength.256  Greene reinforces Alicea and Drakeman’s argument that 
intentionalism has been a part of American judicial practice since the 
very beginning, but he bolsters the case by showing that it has never 
really left the courts.257  As here, Greene distinguishes “intentionalists” 
from “expectations originalist[s]” and acquits the Low Originalists of 
that recalcitrant charge.258  Though Greene’s authority-based justifica-
tion for considering speaker’s meaning is not identical to their mod-
els, he explicitly and repeatedly agrees with Low Originalists.259  Pro-
 
252 This debate is becoming quite prominent.  E.g., Randy Barnett and Judge J. Harvie Wil-
kinson, Sixth Annual Rosenkranz Debate Resolved:  Courts are Too Deferential to the 
Legislature (Nov. 14–16, 2013), available at http://youtube.com/watch?v=evp84_XcSwY. 
253 See J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY:  WHY AMERICANS ARE 
LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 33 (2012) (“Originalism, with its 
myriad virtues, has an important role to play in constitutional adjudication, but it suffers 
from that all-too-common infirmity of cosmic constitutional theory:  a lack of judicial re-
straint.”). 
254 Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
1343, 1372 (2009). 
255 Id. (emphasis added). 
256 Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1685 (2012) 
(“[O]riginal intent not only matters but it matters more than original meaning.”). 
257 Id. at 1689–1701 (discussing “the practice relevance of original intent”). 
258 Id. at 1702. 
259 He agrees with Kay specifically, with whose position Greene affiliates Alexander, Prakash, 
and Whittington.  Id. 
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fessor Greene argues that “the time has come to bring intentionalists 
back into the constitutional mainstream.”260  His proposal has Low 
Originalists marching under the banner of intentionalism.  But as we 
have seen, that term creates confusion about whose intent is sought 
and what role it plays, an involution that led to the earliest criticisms 
of originalism261 and thereby contributed to the rise of High Original-
ism. 
An early warning sounds when Alicea and Drakeman adopt Peter 
Smith’s categories of “Old Originalism, New Originalism, and New 
New Originalism[.]”262  Is the original New Originalism now the Old 
New Originalism?  One gets the impression that if originalism con-
tinues to evolve for much longer, it will adopt version numbers like 
software updates.  Originalism’s critics have at times reveled in its 
pluralism, seizing on the diversity of thought as a hypocritical flaw; 
piling adjective upon adjective can only strengthen the critics’ 
claims.263  It is past time to abandon chronological labels.  If it is help-
ful to organize the many varieties of originalism—syntactic textualism, 
original-methods originalism, semantic originalism—according to 
some fundamental attribute, let it be whether the text is written by 
real human hands, spoken by real human voices. 
The label “Low Originalism” will itself comprise many diverse 
strains of originalist theory.  It certainly will not end the misunder-
standings of originalism’s history or current taxonomy.  But it will 
avoid significant liminal perplexity and clean things up as the theory 
moves forward.  Of course, Low Originalism itself is not invulnerable.  
Looking to the authors and enactors requires dealing with Old 
Originalism’s foes, and any such account will have to explain why the 
move to High Originalism was ill-begat.  These High Originalists mar-
shal many formidable arguments, none of which this Comment has 
treated in any depth.  Like the Constitution, Low Originalism is a 
human affair fraught with human weaknesses.  But it has the ad-
vantage of admitting that fact and living with it. 
 
260 Id. at 1687. 
261 See supra Part II.B. 
262 Alicea & Drakeman, supra note 248, at 1164 (citing Peter J. Smith, How Different Are 
Originalism and Non-Originalism?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 707–08, 725 (2011)). 
263 See Colby & Smith, supra note 129, at 305 (noting that originalism’s differences “under-
mine the rhetorical and normative claims that underlie much of the originalist enter-
prise”). 
. 
1568 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:5 
 
CONCLUSION 
Part II of this Comment told a story of originalism in order to 
place the interpretive enterprise in context.  It noted that the shift 
from intent to public meaning, while real, was not nearly so clear or 
decisive as is sometimes presented.  Thus, Old Originalists were nei-
ther intentionalists nor original-public-meaning originalists.  Part II 
then separated New Originalism in to the High Originalists and the 
Low Originalists.  The conceptual analysis of the New Originalism at-
tempted to show that High Originalism, while dominant, is neither 
alone nor necessarily the most compelling model, and that its he-
gemony is beginning to crumble. 
Originalism is besieged by claims of hypocrisy and inconsistency, 
by the charge that it has abandoned any pretense to judicial restraint.  
This Comment suggests that this is a phenomenon of High Original-
ism.  The solution lies in speaker’s meaning, or intent, or whatever 
name you want to give it.  I call it Low Originalism, indicating its em-
brace of the humanness of our messy political lives.  Abstracted-
principles originalism—High Originalism—is too divorced from reality 
to do any good to constitutional communities.  The call for a com-
mon sense understanding of meaning drawn from and accessible to 
citizens—We the People—is an urgent one that resonates with the 
words of Thomas Jefferson at the beginning of this Comment. 
If this Comment accomplishes nothing else, I hope that it un-
scrambles the facile paradigm that identifies “Old” with “original in-
tent seekers” and “New” with “public meaning seekers.”  The New 
Originalism was not a triumph of the High Originalists over their un-
sophisticated Old Originalist opponents.  Rather, when the High 
Originalists came onto the stage, they inaugurated the era of New 
Originalism wherein they were ascendant for a time.  Originalists to-
day are still synthesizing (and sometimes syncretizing) their creed. 
In conclusion, I suggest that Low Originalism is the road plied by 
two of New Originalism’s greatest figures:  Keith Whittington and Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia.  Whittington’s originalism is quite thorough and 
he explicates it largely in objectivist terms.  While he demands some 
level of publicity, he also insists that the communities who promul-
gated the text are not irrelevant.264  Justice Scalia’s judicial practice is 
the subject of much Sturm und Drang,265 but in light of the discussion 
herein, it is easy to see how the dust-up over original expectations fits 
 
264 WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 246, at 35–36. 
265 See, e.g., Note, Original Meaning and Its Limits, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1279, 1282–83 (2007) 
(outlining critiques of Justice Scalia’s arguments). 
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a model of Low Originalism without falling prey to Dworkin’s carica-
ture.  It remains to another article—and to the reader in the interim—
to examine originalist writers through the lens proposed herein. 
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APPENDIX: GOOGLE NGRAM VIEWER 
